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Personhood and Radical Embodied Cognition
by João de Pina-Cabral
This paper investigates the relationship between personhood and family in light of the impact that radical embodied
cognition has had in anthropological theory over the past years. The paper is based on a study of onomastic seriality
among siblings and cohabiting cousins in Brazil, where it became clear that interruption of the series is more
common than full compliance. Since name attribution is a central aspect of launching early personal ontogeny, the
paper argues that this kind of interrupted seriality amounts to a narrative strategy of triangulation that fosters the
creative imagining of familial persons. The paper attempts to deepen our understanding of the modes of operation
of personhood by diverging from the established representationist theories of cognition that remain dominant in
anthropological circles.
Recently, revisiting Monica Wilson’s (1951) Nyakyusa eth-
nographies, I was strongly alerted to the myriad modes in
which human imagination in history can produce company
while, at the same time, company is that which produces
humans. The apparent circularity in this process should not
disturb us, as it is temporally staggered. The person is born as
a member of the human species but is not born fully human
to the extent that it is only in the course of personal ontogeny
that we enter into propositional thinking and acquire a re-
ﬂexive awareness of ourselves as human (see Pina-Cabral
2014a, 2014b).
Humans share with other animals the capacity to engage
in intentional thinking; our very life processes are dependent
on the continued operation of “basic mind” (cf. Hutto and
Myin 2013). But in order to become fully human, we have to
be enticed into humanity by other humans who had already
been enticed by others before them, and so on and so forth,
back to the gradual and discreet origins of the human species.
Supporters of radical embodied cognition have been arguing
convincingly for a while that “nonverbal responding, quite
generally, only involves the having of intentional—but not
propositional—attitudes” (Hutto 2008:xiii; cf. also Chemero
2009; Varela, Thompson, and Rosch 1991). The central
propositional attitudes of belief and desire can be acquired
only by participating in what they call “unscripted conver-
sational exchanges” (Hutto 2008:136). They propose that
while basic mind is nonrepresentational, it is the origin and
source of personhood. But humans are driven out of infant
solipsism during early ontogeny and come to acquire in the
course of social engagement a scaffolded mind (Hutto and
Myin 2013). We do so by engaging in company—that is,
complex communicational contexts where viewpoints clash
and where we are subject to a diverse series of unscripted
narratives and explanations, centrally involving the manip-
ulation of pronouns and personal names.
The entry into propositional thinking is a kind of scaf-
folding of mind, and it is not limited to the learning of lan-
guage. In fact, the mere learning of language forms does not
account fully for the process of learning of meaning within
language. It is by experimenting with language in contexts of
company—and, especially, when we start experimenting with
the tasks that other people carry out in front of us, after our
ninth month (Trevarthen 1990, 1993)—that we come to work
out the more abstract associations of meaning that are implicit
in adult language use. As Bowerman (1982) has shown, “only
gradually do children begin to discern relationships and reg-
ularities among linguistic forms that they have not previously
recognized as related, and to integrate these forms into more
abstract, patterned systems” (320). This, of course, applies to
personal names and to the way in which children come to
learn how to use their own names and those of the people
who surround them and the complex implications of having
names of different nature and using them in different ways
(cf. Pina-Cabral 2005, 2013a).
The constitution of a personal arena of presence and action
(i.e., an ego, a self, amoi; cf. Johnston 2010; Trevarthen 1993)
is a basic condition for the competent use of human natural
languages, including personal pronouns. There would be no
speech acts if there were no grammatical persons to position
themselves within them. But this is an effect of active en-
gagement in sociality during early ontogeny. As Judith Butler
(2012) noted, for there to be a ﬁrst person, there has to have
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been a previous process of differentiation, an “ego related-
ness”: “primary relations precede the formation of what we
call an ‘ego’ and even the ‘ego’ is understood primarily as
consisting of modes of ‘ego relatedness’” (113). People are
called into language from the outside, so the third person is in
some sense (a very Freudian sense, as it turns out) the ﬁrst
entry into language, because it is the ﬁrst entry into selfhood.
However, since basic mind continues to operate for as long as
we are alive, our arenas of presence and action (our selves)
will ever remain mysteriously evanescent—a theme that
philosophers and poets have explored throughout the ages.
In the process of becoming persons, we stop being individual;
we become “dividual” (cf. Pina-Cabral 2013a, 2013b; Strathern
1988:11–14). It is in this sense that Monica Wilson’s (1957:226)
Nyakyusa informants famously stated that kinsmen were “mem-
bers of one another” (cf. in Sahlins 2011a).
Personal names are one of the principal means of estab-
lishing the externality of personhood, which in turn is a
condition for speech acts to be constituted in terms of per-
sonal pronouns. As constitutive modes of objectifying per-
sonhood, personal names play a central role in the process of
early ontogeny, as well as throughout the rest of life (cf.
Pina-Cabral 2010b). This is why they function more like
third-person pronouns than the ﬁrst and second personal
pronouns. Long ago, Émile Benveniste (1966) demonstrated
that the ﬁrst-person and second-person pronouns operate
differently from the third-person pronoun (he/she) in that
they are “empty,” as he put it: “their role is to provide the
instrument for a conversion . . . of language into speech”
(254). While “I” and “you” are positional indicators, “he/she”
are substitutes for objects of speech (as in, “Peter ate the
apple. He loved it.”). “I” and “you” are positional; they do
not demand a reference external to the speech act. To the
contrary, “he/she” stand for something that is external. There
is, indeed, a profound truth to this observation, for it has
implications in the matter of early personal ontogeny. We
must not assume that there is any anteriority to the ﬁrst or
second persons, for if we did, we would be falling into the
trap of separating language use (speech) from the historical
process of the constitution of the speaking person. We have
to understand that the “substitution” that the third person
operates, to use Benveniste’s terms, is the original process
that allows for the constitution of the other two: as we have
come to know, subjectivity follows on intersubjectivity, not
the other way round (see Trevarthen 1980).
There would be no speech acts if there were no persons to
position themselves within them. The third person, in some
sense, is the door into language because it is his/her presence
that leads the person into selfhood. For there to be a ﬁrst-
person ego, there has to have been a previous process of dif-
ferentiation, an ego relatedness, since “participation” within
contexts of dwelling is the original condition.1 People are
called into language from the outside, so the third person is a
previous requirement for the use of the other two persons
and their respective personal pronouns (cf. Butler 2012).
Thus, each human being starts his or her personal ontogeny—
his or her path of being—inside human contagion. We dis-
cover our own personal singularity from within intersub-
jectivity—and this is why the very word “intersubjectivity” is
equivocal, since it seems to suggest that subjectivity would be
anterior to it, which is not the case.2
In the justly famous chapter on naming in The Savage
Mind, Lévi-Strauss (1966) argues that he is “trying to show
that, in any society—even if people think they are acting
freely—their choice and use of proper names reﬂects a way
of slicing up the social and moral universe, of categorizing
individuals, and of translating how each culture conceives of
the reciprocal relations between human beings and their
various domestic animals” (155). In the wake of recent
developments in the theory of kinship (cf. Sahlins 2011a,
2011b), I propose a distinct outlook on naming, where the
exercise of creative freedom is seen as the very mode through
which persons are formed in sociality. Rather than slicing
up the social and moral universe by placing previously
deﬁned individuals within previously determined categories,
proper naming is seen here as a way in which historically
and biologically grounded persons (i.e., persons in ontoge-
ny) are brought into being as reﬂexive persons. Phylogenesis
and ontogeny are seen as history, therefore.3 What I most
disagree with in Lévi-Strauss’s theory of naming is that it
places societies as analytically separate from personhood. To
the contrary, I see social processes as constituting themselves
by accumulation in history, not as a response to separately
existing systems of symbols but within personal ontogeny.
Living persons are, so to speak, the ground of sociality.
In this paper, I attempt to bring radical embodied cog-
nition to reﬂect on anthropological theories of personhood
by addressing the theoretical challenges posed by onomastic
seriality among siblings and cohabiting cousins—a form of
proper name attribution very prevalent in the coastal regions
of the state of Bahia in Brazil, where I carried out ﬁeldwork
between 2004 and 2012. The essay links the notion of se-
riality with a conception of personhood that sees it as
emerging from sociality historically and, in that sense, pro-
longs a debate that has been signiﬁcant in anthropology for
some time (Ingold 1995; Toren 1990, 1993). In this paper, by
radically rejecting the representationist formulations that
have dominated our discipline since the days of Durkheim, I
adopt a distinct view of personhood and of cognition from
1. Confusingly, Vasunari Reddy (2008:26ff.) calls “second person”
the process that anthropologists, in the wake of Lévy-Bruhl, have long
2. The argument in the previous three paragraphs is further developed
in Pina-Cabral (2014a).
3. By relation to phylogenesis, see Ingold (1986, 1991, 1995); by
relation to ontogeny, see Toren (1990, 1993, 1999, 2002, 2012).
been calling “participation.” I am convinced that, in essence, my ar-
gument does not conﬂict with her interesting insights.
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that espoused, for example, by Maurice Bloch (2012) in his
recent book on the anthropology of cognition. My position is
originally indebted to the reading of Wittgenstein by the
Oxford poststructuralists and Rodney Needham (e.g., 1987)
in particular, and it is akin to the arguments in favor of
overcoming the Cartesian gap that have emerged of late from
within psychology and other disciplines (cf. Reddy 2008:
24–25).
Personhood and Naming
In the early 1990s, while carrying out ﬁeldwork among the
Eurasian population of Macao, I developed an analytic in-
terest in the workings of personhood and the way they can
be highlighted through studying the equivoques character-
istic of transcultural interaction (Pina-Cabral 2002a). The
debates concerning personhood and individualism that were
all the rage in anthropology back then promised to open up a
new perspective, where the sociocentric proclivities of our
predecessors might be creatively challenged (Marriott 1976;
Strathern 1988 vs. Cohen 1994; Macfarlane 1978).
Therefore, in 2004, when I moved to the study of Brazil—
more particularly, to the mangrove regions of the southern
coast of Bahia—I decided to focus on modes of personal
naming as my main area of ethnographic attention. I have
since then published extensively on the topic.4 Nevertheless,
perhaps because I could see it was such a fascinating ana-
lytical challenge, I have so far stayed shy of discussing one of
my ﬁrst ethnographic surprises: among the low-income
population of the provincial town I studied (Valença), per-
sonal names were often surprisingly creative. The histori-
cally dominant practice among Portuguese and Spanish
speakers of naming children by means of a rather short list
of time-honored saints’ names (Pina-Cabral 2012b) was less
favored here than a mode of inventing names by articulating
onomastic particles, which presented itself both as more
creative and more evocative. To cut a long story short, there
was a taste for attributing names serially. In this paper, I will
argue that onomastic seriality is particularly illuminating
when we want to explore the way in which familial persons
are constituted.
The word “series” refers to a category, the terms of which
form a sequence, being related to each other by means of a
formula of derivation. I am particularly interested in open-
ended series, for they subject themselves to the sort of
imaginative disposition that Rodney Needham (1975, 1978,
1987) long ago designated by the word “polythetic.” Now, if
we adopt a view of personhood as constructed within soci-
ality, the propositional act of naming someone or of naming
oneself can be seen as an act of imagination (cf. Toren 2012).
In this paper, I want to explore the way in which Brazilian
practices of onomastic seriality operate as instances of cre-
ative imagination.5
Processes of sociality occur among other species; nonhu-
man species also have complex forms of communication
based on intentionality. What there is not in other species is
reﬂexive subjects, engaged in propositional thinking: in
short, persons with scaffolded minds. We become persons
when we are in sociality with other humans who are already
engaged in their own history of personhood. The process of
entering into personhood is not something that is con-
sciously enacted each time, for each one of us. Intersubjec-
tivity is not a choice; it happens. Humans entice other
humans into personhood because they are prone to include
babies in their lived worlds. It is all rather inevitable once a
baby is among humans and is being cared for during the
long period of maturation that the human species demands
(Trevarthen 1980).
Plurally cohabiting the world—company—is the indis-
pensible condition for personhood. As Colwyn Trevarthen
has demonstrated: “Babies are interested in stories long be-
fore they speak. . . . Children from the age of six months
onwards . . . are starting to be part of culture. They want a
rich environment, with lots of different kinds of people
doing different things, not totally unfamiliar. It is to build a
kind of working community, with jobs.”6 The arousal of
subjectivity in the person—that is, the oncoming of propo-
sitional thinking (Hutto 2008; Trevarthen 1993)—happens
through an engagement with a plurality of human beings, a
kind of triangulation. Each one of us, therefore, carries a
prehistory: there is in our personhood a historicity, an im-
manent pastness (see Martins 1974). Paradoxically, the past-
ness of personhood cannot be bounded by personal ontog-
eny in the sense that if the person emerges from attachments
that predate the person’s constitution, then, while the child is
new, the “other” is not. And, as Donald Winnicott (1971)
came to understand long ago, it is never only one other.
Dividuality results directly from the process of ontogeny.
In short, since there is a foundational alterity in person-
hood, the notion that there is a clean beginning to it makes
no sense. Not only do persons emerge from the embrace of
earlier persons in child-rearing, but they also see themselves
as causally linked to earlier persons (that which anthro-
pologists usually refer to as “ﬁliation”; see Shapiro 2008).
Such a process is not a generalized condition; rather, it is
grounded on speciﬁc human relations whose history is unique
in the case of each one of us: our personal history of ontogeny.
While the history of each one’s existence as a determinable
person is immersed in the long history of sociality, none of us
4. Cf. Pina-Cabral (2002a, 2005, 2010a, 2010b, 2012a, 2012b, 2013a).
5. I owe my original inspiration on naming largely to the thought of
Donald Davidson (e.g., 2001) and Emanuel Lévinas (e.g., 1971).
6. Extract of oral communication in http://www.educationscotland
.gov.uk/earlyyears/prebirthtothree/nationalguidance/conversations/colwyn
trevarthen.asp (accessedNovember 30, 2014). Cf. Trevarthen (1998).
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can be reduced to a simple manifestation of an overarching
totality—our namers are particular others, not a generic other
(Pina-Cabral 2013a).
To borrow Maurice Bloch’s (2012) words, “there exist no
human beings in general but only speciﬁc human beings
who are made different by their culture” (33). But I would
rather have preferred to say, with Christina Toren (cf. 1990),
made different by their speciﬁc personal history, their on-
togeny. Personhood, then, involves at least three different
aspects:7
a) The physical human person in ontogeny—indeed, a
truly individual phenomenon.
b) The “arena of presence and action,” as Johnston has
called it (2010)—a dividual and partible phenomenon, not
only in Melanesia and India (Marriott 1976; Strathern 1988)
but also everywhere else (Pina-Cabral 2013a).
g) The historically constructed narratives of personhood
that pervade the environment within which personal on-
togeny occurs—here individuality and dividuality are com-
bined in very many different ways, depending on what
anthropologists normally call “culture.”
This is the reason why separating simply between “indi-
vidual” and “individualism,” as Nigel Rapport proposes
(2010), is not enough to solve the matter of personhood,
since even our formulation of personhood g above could
raise problems, for it might be interpreted as implying that
people have concepts in their heads that their culture gave
them as concepts and that they share with the other mem-
bers of their culture as concepts, having learned them as
concepts. And yet, the process of integrating meanings
within language (the scaffolding of mind) is a fully personal
one. The representationist approach is false: the cognitive
processes of each one of us are indeterminate and cannot be
repeated. Quine (1960) argued this quite convincingly a long
time ago, but that is even clearer now in terms of our present
knowledge of neurophysiology (cf. Anderson, Richardson,
and Chemero 2012). The “Nuer notion of the person” is
nothing but the identiﬁcation by the ethnographer of a
statistical recurrence among the Nuer in the ways they cope
with personhood: it is the fact that, in order to circulate in a
Nuer world, one must assume a determinable but open-
ended set of associations and recurrences that amount to
broad parameters of what persons are in that particular
human historical setting. We have been alerted to this for a
very long time—it was, after all, the central quandary that
engaged Robert Feleppa (1988) in his book on the philo-
sophical problems that face the comparative study of cul-
ture—but most of us took a long time to come round to ad-
mit that we needed to face the problem of representation
head-on. We have been too slow to take the conclusions re-
quired by the shedding off of what Sartre (1936) called a
“naïve metaphysics of image” (3).
It is important not to jump to the conclusion that person
a would be “universal,” person b would be “individual,” and
person g would be “cultural.” This would be to assume both a
mind-body polarity and a representationist model of mind—
analytical dispositions that radical embodied cognition rejects.
We should be clear, therefore, that a (the material person in
ontogeny), b (the reﬂexive person), and g (the culturally shared
frameworks of personhood) are all both universal and histori-
cally speciﬁc. The notion that human inherence in history is
divided into neatly separable cultural worlds/ontologies is a
sociocentric mirage that has produced much misunderstand-
ing and hindered our anthropological theorizing very seriously
over the years (see Pina-Cabral 2014a). But so is the notion that
one might be able to have any grasp of personhood g (e.g., the
Nuer notion of person) aside from its instantiation in actual
human persons (a 1 b 1 g). It would be like suggesting that
there are cultures whose identity lies outside of history, the com-
plex history of human interaction—a form of semiotic ideal-
ism. Only physical (a), reﬂexive, and interactive (b) persons
can come together in culturally identiﬁable modes of being
person (g). In short, there are no generic Nuers. This being said,
we must conclude that since learning to use personal pronouns
and receiving a personal name are central processes in launch-
ing personal ontogeny, persons are called into being in narra-
tive processes, both metaphorically and literally.
Hyvian’s Proper Name
In Portuguese-speaking contexts, the person is objectiﬁed
within speech by means of a conjugation of three modes of
naming that we will simplify here by using the English terms
“proper name,” “surname,” and “nickname” (Pina-Cabral
2012b). Although each of these forms of naming bears dif-
ferent implications, in this paper I will be dealing mostly
with proper names (nomes próprios). This is relevant for my
argument concerning personhood since, in the European tra-
ditions—as the very use of the adjective “proper” suggests—
proper names are the mode of naming that more closely
qualiﬁes the person in his or her singularity (Pina-Cabral
2012a). When asked to refer reﬂexively about their own self,
people are prone to use proper names rather than surnames.
This is signiﬁcant, for it connects with a historically rooted
tradition that sees intimacy and personhood as essentially
spiritual.8 That is, Euro-American speakers are prone to
associate their personal singularity with their conscious
awareness of themselves. Thus, when I introspect, it is more
appropriate for me to refer to myself as João than as Pina-
Cabral. João is assumed to be the name of my soul, the es-
7. I refer here to “aspect” in the sense that Wittgenstein (1958) gave
the word when he used the famous example of Jastrow’s duckrabbit
(1958:ii–xi, 193–229) and that Needham (1983) further developed in
Against the Tranquility of Axioms.
8. See Givens’s (2009) history of the Christian soul, where this
matter is debated at length.
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sence of my personhood; Pina-Cabral is a collective noun, a
more formal qualiﬁer.
It is not, therefore, by chance that Mauss’s (1938) dis-
cussion of the notion of personhood ﬁrst emerged in a re-
view that he published in the Année Sociologique of Lévy-
Bruhl’s (1974 [1923]:129–130) book on the âme primitive,
long before he went to London to deliver his classical essay
on the topic. As in so many other cases, anthropological de-
ethnocentriﬁcation challenged one of the most profound
tenets of the European intellectual tradition.9
In the European tradition, surnames operate more in the
categorizing manner that Lévi-Strauss described above than
proper names.10 Contrary to surnames, personal names are
more prone to reﬂect the sort of constitutive contagion
between persons that Lévy-Bruhl (1949) used to refer to as
“participation” or that Sahlins (2011a, 2011b) has recently
identiﬁed by the expression “co-presence.” Onomastic seri-
ality does not form groups of persons; rather, it creates
chains of persons. It is characteristically open-ended, and it
places people within networks of relations by means of
triangulation.
Moreover, there is nothing speciﬁcally Brazilian about
proper name seriality. The use of generational particles in
proper names among Chinese upper-class families during
the Ming and Qing Dynasties are a well-known instance
(Alleton 1993); another one is the custom of naming chil-
dren with the ﬁrst letter of their grandparents’ proper names,
as remains a habit among Ashkenazy Jews in Europe, Israel,
or the United States; also among the batellier families of the
canals of northern France, similar onomastic systems are
reported to have occurred (Wateau 1989).
The practice of creating intergenerational namesakes
might be seen as a form of seriality, but I have chosen to deal
with it separately elsewhere, as it has a distinct set of im-
plications when approached comparatively (Pina-Cabral
2010b). In the present paper, I will deal with a mode of
naming that, in Brazil, is associated both with a hankering
for consumerist modernity and with the sort of large cohorts
of siblings and cousins that have characterized the urban and
periurban modes of living of low-income populations up to
the present date. Brazilian colleagues have suggested that,
with the decrease in family size presently occurring, this
fashion of naming will fade. This could turn out to be the
case, but I have no evidence to point in that direction. Since
name seriality is as common among siblings as among co-
habiting cousins, the reduction in the number of children a
woman has should not affect the process.
For example, I recorded a group of siblings called Marilson,
Moacir, Maila, and Mailani; another called Leiá, Lúcio, and
Leane; and another called Edson, Edílson, and Edmilson.
There is seriality in the fact that the siblings’ names bear the
same particle—usually but not always at the beginning of the
name, linking it up to a parental or grandparental name. But
there is seriality also in names such as Antonádia, which
conjugates the names of both parents (António and Nádia),
or Ildailze, which conjugates the names of both grand-
mothers. There is also a kind of grammar of constitution. So
“-son,” “-ar,” and “-io” are male sufﬁxes, and “-ani/ane,”
“-aila,” and “-ele/eli” are female sufﬁxes. This kind of gram-
mar, however, will never come to be a precise science, as what
drives the whole process is precisely a desire to be diferente, a
concept that in popular Brazil has very positive connotations.
I will now report on a banal instance of ﬁrst name use in
which I participated in Brazil. On ﬁrst arriving at a gym, I
introduced myself to the gym attendant, a jovial, handsome
woman of about 25 years. Following general Brazilian
practice, I merely used my ﬁrst name: “Meu nome é João.” In
turn, she replied with her name, but I failed to grasp it. She
smiled when I asked her to repeat it, thus signaling that she
fully expected me to ask. She replied in a practiced fashion:
“Hy-vi-an, with an h and a y.”
By now familiar with Brazilian naming practices, I im-
mediately made a whole series of surmises based on that
name. Brieﬂy, then, I ﬁrst surmised that this was a proper
name and not a surname; second, it was what Brazilians
classify a nome diferente, an uncommon name; third, the fact
of it being uncommon pleased her, even as it made her have
to spell it out to all newcomers; fourth, the constitution of
the name pointed to it being a serial name; and ﬁfth, her
parents belonged to the recently urbanized lower middle
class, and the fact that she readily presented herself by that
name and not by a fashionable abbreviation or hypocoristic
meant that she too belonged to that status group.
A few days later, when I got to know her better, I asked
her, “So, do you have a sister with a similar name [nome
parecido]?” She smiled again, acknowledging that she was
pleased that I had guessed, and proceeded to provide me
with a lengthy explanation. In fact, in spite of being in-
terrupted by other clients, she returned twice to the side of
my stepping machine in order to ﬁnish the story. Debating
her name was something that she felt valued her and that
could be done legitimately in public.
“Yes, I have a twin sister called Hysis,” she replied. As it
turns out, she also had a irmã de criação (a foster sister)
whom her parents named Haldane, also with an h (which
Brazilians generally pronounce as a throatal r). In fact, all
these names make reference to the mother’s name, Helena.
The father, in turn, is called Wilson, and the two brothers are
called Winston and Wiverton, both with w. Finally, her
younger sister is called Laura, failing to comply with the
seriality. This too was something that I was fully expecting.
Having encountered numberless cases of sibling name se-
9. But the tendency to return to old ways did not simply vanish. For
example, there is a peculiar recurrence to the bafﬂement caused by
Chinese notions of soul/spirit in twentieth-century ethnographers (see
Pina-Cabral 2002a).
10. As a matter of fact, in The Savage Mind, Lévi-Strauss (1966:186)
already identiﬁes the importance of the difference between serial and
group naming that will engage us in this paper.
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riality throughout Brazil over the years, I had come to see
that serial incompleteness is the norm, not the exception.
Brieﬂy, then, how does Hyvian read her name and those
of the people whose names are tied to hers? As I gathered,
she is pleased with the connotations of these names. In fact,
she stressed in her explanation that they remit to a cosmo-
politan world that she and her parents value. In this way,
their personhood is tied to forms of living to which they
aspire within today’s global order. Her brother Winston, she
explained (wrongly as it turns out), has the name of an Amer-
ican president, and the other names in the series, Wiverton,
Wilson, and Haldane, are also American (and again it is
not relevant whether she was right or wrong). As it turns
out, the very letters w and y do not exist in the Portuguese
alphabet and openly connote Anglo-American (gringo)
foreignness.
That her name should be “different,” in fact, is valued
because, as many people explained to me over the years in
Brazil, it picks them out from the crowd; according to them,
it means that their name does not “copy” anyone else’s, that
they are themselves alone. This connects strongly to the value
of “self-afﬁrmation” (auto-aﬁrmação) that Luíz Fernando
Dias Duarte has identiﬁed as central to contemporary Bra-
zilian living (Duarte and Gomes 2008).
That differentness should be such an openly acknowl-
edged value in no way implies that Brazilians are any less
conventional than other peoples around the world. It does
not even imply that they do not repeat names, for name
repetition is also a notable feature of local personal naming
systems. Thus, people will often give their male ﬁrstborn the
exact full name of the father, grandfather, or uncle, adding a
particle indicating the relation (e.g., Junior, Filho, Neto,
Sobrinho). Further still, they are also prone to give the names
of celebrities to their children: actresses, singers, football
players, American presidents, and so on. A woman explained
to me proudly that her children’s names “were all con-
nected” (i.e., they formed a series), as they all related to soap
operas: one was given the name of a character, the other of
an actor, and the third of a well-known socialite who is the
wife of yet a third soap opera actor.
The fact that Hyvian’s name is part of a series is an aspect
of her name both to her and to anyone who is familiar with
Brazilian naming practices. It is part of the name’s meaning.
Because it is so, it fosters in Hyvian a sense of sharing an
important part of her personhood with the people whose
names connect with hers—both intergenerationally (her
mother) and intragenerationally (her sisters). She emphati-
cally acknowledged this by relation to her twin sister, Hysis,
whom she claims to “love very much.” She also explicitly
commented that she likes the fact that the two names bring
them together while at the same time differentiate them as
separate persons. Listening to her explain this, I could see
that her sense of personal connection with the whole series
constitutes an important source of personal security, which
is foundational of her own sense of being herself—of her
“arena of presence and action,” as Mark Johnston (2010:139–
141) would have it. Being secure in her personhood and being
secure in her familial insertion are cumulative and mutually
reinforcing.
This, however, could have been challenged by the fact that
one of her sisters is called Laura. Are we to assume that this
person feels somehow left out of family life or, alternatively,
somehow raised above the monotony of the rest? This was a
question that haunted me since I ﬁrst hit on the notion that
breaking the series is of the essence of Brazilian onomastic
seriality.
One of the ﬁrst series of names I recorded was Adailton,
Ademar, Adriano, Lucas, Adriele, and Adriana. I asked
Adriano, a boy of about 16 years of age, why his brother was
called Lucas, to which he replied that it was when his mother
became a “believer” (crente), a member of a neo-Pentecostal
church. Did his brother mind being called that? I asked. But
Adriano could not understand at all what I could possibly be
asking.
Similarly, Hyvian just shrugged her shoulders when I
asked about Laura. Finally, one day, I met two educated
sisters at a dinner party at a friend’s house in Valença. One
of them was part of a series of Eu’s, the father having been
called Eugénio; the other was the exception, Indianara. I
asked my question again, and, being married to a Frenchman
and having lived a long time in Europe, she saw what I was
getting at. But she claimed never to have thought that it
might have been a bad thing. She claimed that, now that I
made her think about it, she could see that she did not dislike
having a different name, as it made her feel somehow special.
In any case, she claimed, all her siblings had related names
and this meant their family identity was very strong, which
pleased her.
In the case of Osvaldo, Osnivaldo, Osvaldino, and Ananias Jr.,
the serial O refers to the mother, while the last son some-
how reinforces the associative link by referring to the father.
But in cases like Lucas and so many others I encountered,
the dislocated name is a simple, matter-of-fact response to a
biographical accident. The breaking of seriality is a way of
leaving seriality open—as Needham (1975) would have it, of
making the family polythetic. The process is systemic only to
the extent that it is systematically incomplete.
What this means is that the cross-references among peo-
ple that onomastic seriality proposes never rise above the
persons they constitute; they do not form collective ab-
stracted schemes. In this way, one is reminded of Tim
Ingold’s (2007) distinction between rhythm and metronymic
time setting. Brazilian serialities are what he calls “reso-
nances,” that is, modes of “rhythmic harmonization of mu-
tual attention” (Ingold 2007:163). When I encounter a name
such as Hyvian, Edivaldo, Osvaldino, or Adilson, I can safely
presume that it rhymes with other names in that family; thus,
the name promotes familial harmonization. But, as there are
252 Current Anthropology Volume 57, Number 3, June 2016
always the Lauras, Lucas, Indianaras, and Ananias that break
the series, the process never postulates family as closed group.
It safeguards the singularity of personhood in the face of its
serial plurality, its dividuality. It prevents family from reduc-
ing personhood. It produces “family resemblance,” literally
in the way that Wittgenstein (1958) meant to attribute to the
expression.
Connotation
Strictly speaking, seriality is merely a formal process. How-
ever, to the extent that the sound that produces the seriality
is usually picked from a member of the generation above, it
necessarily connotes that person or that person’s assumed
qualities. To the extent that seriality functions as homage
(homenagem, another central concept in Brazilian family life)
it necessarily implies connotation. This can be observed also in
cases that, at ﬁrst, may not even appear to be serial but then,
once one identiﬁes the connotation, are shown to be so. There
is, for instance, in Valença a medical doctor, the ﬁrst letters
of whose children’s names form the acronym “FAMILIA.”
Another such case is a colleague of mine who explained that
she and her sisters had serial names. Being familiar with their
names, however, I could not see why that was so, until she
explained, “Don’t you see? They are all different names.” By
“different” she meant uncommon, but uncommon in a way
that she considered to be a source of value.
Connotation and seriality seem to be inseparable in at
least two ways. First, the people I interviewed in Bahia in-
sisted endlessly that the name they chose for their child must
“sound good.” To a person like myself, brought up in Saus-
surean linguistics, such a statement can be read only as a
metaphor; it is entirely destitute of literal meaning. But,
when I asked them to explain what they meant, they insisted
on the literal interpretation. For them, the actual sound bears
goodness. A mother once explained to us that her son’s name
is Cauã because this is a soft, beautiful sound and she does
not want him to grow into a hard man. This we interpreted to
be an angry comment against the man who had fathered her
child. She seemed to be totally unaware that, for other people,
the Amerindian name Cauã may actually sound rough or
brutal.
Second, there is what the people call “meaning”: names
bear value; they promote the named person in some sort of
connotative fashion. The fact is that seriality promotes
connotation in a metonymical way, not a metaphorical one,
not specularly but through contagion (Pina-Cabral 2013a).
People are dividual to the extent that they are co-present
with other people. However, once they achieve singularity,
through serial transformation, they become once again plu-
ral. As Marilyn Strathern (1988:14–18) would have us see,
these are not processes of duality, where two persons con-
front each other in specular mode. Rather, they are processes
where plurality is created by varying a common principle.
In order to show how that occurs in real life, I will now
present here a translated extract of a conversation between a
female research assistant and a young mother at the public
maternity of Valença in 2006.
Q: Is Karine your cousin?
A: Yes, and Kelly is her younger sister. They are
children of my paternal aunt, Luzimeire. Then
there is my uncle Luís, whose children are called
Kleber and Klaus; they are older than my sister
Katherine.
Q: And is that all with the same letter [K]?
A: Yes, all ﬁve: Kleber, Klaus, Katharine, Kelly,
and Karine. I’m the only one out. . . . I am the
only one of the cousins who escaped.
Q: You are the youngest one, right? Why is
yours with an A?
A: My [maternal] grandfather wanted to call me
Erica, but Karine did not allow it because she
said it was ugly or something. I don’t know; in
any case she would not allow it. So they decided
for Adriana.
Q: But the ones with K, who was it that decided?
A: My father’s family. I was the one that broke
out. He looked hard for one for me . . . Katiúscia,
Kátia. . . . “Let us try a K,” he would say. But
then . . . there was a fashion for a singer named
Adriana [Calcanhoto]. My mother was in love
with her and her grandfather also. So, when
people asked the baby’s name, even before I was
born, they started saying, “It will be Adriana.”
So it stuck.
Q: And why the K?
A: Oh, it started with Katherine. It was the
grandmother, because of an actress. They still
have an old magazine with her name [Katherine
Hepburn]. Klaus, Katherine, Kleber, Kelly.
Q: And Klaus?
A: Well, that was my grandfather with uncle
Luís: they decided that. Also because of a movie
actor.
Q: So it was all because of actors?
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A: Also because of the meaning. My mother
knew the meaning; I think it is because it is
Russian. And for my own child is the same; the
name has to “come to the head.” My mother
insisted: “Call her Mariana, joining Mário [the
child’s father] with Adriana.” But I said, “No, I
don’t like it.”
Here we can observe three processes of seriality. The ﬁrst
one is the intragenerational seriality in K of a group of
cousins who are brought up in close proximity. Why K is
something that even the grandmother that fell under the
spell of Katherine Hepburn might ﬁnd hard to explain.
Nevertheless, this does not reduce the connotative logic of
the reference. The second is the intergenerational seriality of
the names Luís and Luzimeire (itself a compound of Luís
and Meirí) and of Mariana, a compound of Mário and
Adriana. The third is the way in which the breaking of the
series—as it happens, by ego’s own name—is interpreted as
something that values her while not diminishing or threat-
ening the series. Being “different,” as she insists, is some-
thing that gives her value, but, most of all, it is something
that does not diminish the impact of the seriality of K. By the
time they reached ﬁve names with K, the family members
had had enough; the point had been made; there was no
need to continue. By adopting a new naming mode for
Adriana—and linking her to another famous star—they did
not break away from anything; they merely added another
process of value creation to the value already accrued. They
changed the rhythm without spoiling the music.
Value is created in a cumulative, constructivist fashion. So,
ultimately, I came to see that broken seriality was the norm,
not unbroken seriality. For example, when the doctor whose
children’s names formed the acronym FAMILIA reached the
sixth child—who should have been called with a name
starting with I—his wife’s health was in jeopardy. So, they
agreed to tie up the mother’s ovarian tubes and jumped to
the ﬁnal A.
To go back to Ingold’s metaphor, in a Beethoven string
quartet, as much as in a jazz set, the rhythm of a musical
piece can be suddenly changed halfway through the music in
such a way that it does not destroy the enjoyment of the
music; rather it lifts the listener up to greater fruition. There
is, as it were, a change in scale that fosters the musical en-
joyment by pointing to the possibility of an encompassing
rhythm. Breaking the seriality with a nationalistic name
(Indianara), with an evangelist’s name (Lucas), or with the
namesake of the father changes scale and, thus, instead of
watering down the participation implicit in the serial names,
shifts it to a higher level, a more inclusive one. Similarly,
jumping to the last letter before the series is completed—as
in the acronym FAMIL-A—and thus safeguarding the
mother’s health is again a statement of familial promotion.
The failure to complete all the letters in the word, rather
than making all of them less familiar persons, promotes their
familial co-presence by a change in rhythm, as it were. This
change in rhythm is, in fact, a mode of building meaning
beyond the mere signiﬁcation of names as words; it is a form
of scaffolding meaning.
Conclusion
As we have shown, personal naming practices, with their
rich potential for connotation, are essential for the child’s
constitution of its sense of personhood—its arena of pres-
ence and action. Initially, the child experiences itself and
the carer as being the same before the world—that is
“identiﬁcation.” The child is encouraged by the fact that the
carers themselves are also prone to this same process of
mutuality (they too are prone to shared intentionality;
Tomasello 2008). As Donald Winnicott (1971) argued, it is
when other carers—third parties in the theater of personal
ontogeny—come into contact with the child, and with its
initial closest carer, that it experiences for the ﬁrst time
that terrible sense of betrayal, of aloneness, which Emmanuel
Lévinas (1996) has theorized. In short, this is how it hap-
pens: if I am one with A and one with B, and A and B give
out evidence of not being the same, then surely I have to
be C. Memory of crossed identiﬁcations is what produces
personhood: the aloneness of being C, of being singularly
identiﬁed in the world. It is, therefore, by ﬁnding ourselves
in linguistic contexts where the three persons are at play
that, through triangulation, we come to discover ourselves as
a third person, and that is, in turn, a condition for our en-
gagement in ﬁrst- and second-person interactions. This is
the process of triangulation that leads us from intentionality
to propositionality, from solipsism to reﬂexive, scaffolded
thinking.
For it to occur, we have to engage in language and, fur-
thermore, to construct meaning out of language by an active
engagement with the goings-on of social life (“the jobs,” in
Trevarthen’s words quoted above). Narrative practices are
intrinsic to each person’s personhood, different as these are
from historical context to historical context (person g). All
humans, therefore, tell themselves stories about their own
selves, so to speak, but these stories are not universal. To the
contrary, they are deeply immersed in the localized histori-
cal processes that gave rise to sociality wherever they ﬁnd
themselves. The triangulation that is fostered by family name
seriality is one mode of telling that story and, at the same
time, of instituting social participation. The H in the names
Hyvian and Hysis, in that it connotes their mother, Helena,
is one such constitutive narrative. But it does not limit itself
to the mother-child relation; precisely, it triangulates by
bringing about a plurality of rhythms, and that is where
Laura, Wilson, Winston, Haldane, and Wiverton come in.
What this means is that personhood is familial (cf. Pina-
Cabral 2003). That is, if the person is constituted in the way
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described above, the original experience of being a person is
marked by links that the person will carry throughout his or
her whole life, in the sense that no one can cast away the
constitutive implications of the initial processes of self-
constitution (his or her primary solidarities; cf. Pina-Cabral
2002b).
The triangulations implicit in one’s naming—even when
one’s name changes in the course of one’s life—are forever
inscribed in our constitutive imagination of ourselves: the
narrative we tell of ourselves, our arena of presence and ac-
tion, personhood b. In ontogeny, therefore, at one moment, I
am one with Helena, then one with Hysis, then I come onto
myself as Hyvian. But, just at the same time, I realize that
Winston, Laura, and Haldane all feel they are, in some sense,
together. Being together in a dialectic of mutuality is con-
tinuously reenacted and reinforced by living together in an
ever-complexifying chain of triangulations. Singularity emerges
from plurality; the scaffolded mind emerges from an experi-
ence of “mutuality of being,” as Sahlins (2011a) puts it
somewhat redundantly (see Pina-Cabral 2013b). This is a
process of being together while being different, of having the
same perspective on the world and yet inhabiting different
places. The aspects of personal constitution (of person a,
person b, and person g) all occur within narrative interaction,
and they are processes not of repetition but of invention, not
of mimesis but of contagion. Persons are, therefore, imagined,
and name attribution is a central part of that.
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“Brazilian Serialities” reveals the original and provocative
potential of ethnographic research and anthropological think-
ing at its best. It is most welcome. Following Pina-Cabral, the
practice of naming in families and the making of personhood
in Brazil are knowable only by long-term ﬁeldworkers. The
implications of this ethnographic knowledge are drawn out by
appealing to a multidisciplinary theoretical arena. Here, this
ground is not just comparative anthropology but also psy-
chology and philosophy. Once established, Pina-Cabral can
engage critically those other disciplines without diminishing
the signiﬁcance of either ﬁeldwork or informant experiences
and local meanings. The general value of a well-developed
ethnographic analysis is clearly laid to all scholars, not just
anthropologists.
With this kind of approach, Pina-Cabral can subvert the
notion of the human as generic, that a person can be lifted out
of his or her world, or “company,” as he so pleasingly puts it.
He can then properly argue against representationist theories
of cognition, which are prevalent in anthropology. One might
expect these explanations not to pay much attention to the
frivolities of naming as outlined by Pina-Cabral. So the fact
that Brazilian naming is serial, and patterns are deliberately
broken, rather than corporate, would be unimportant to
representationists. Yet naming is not arbitrary: the singularity
of personhood is the key, not the slicing up of basic similarity
following the classiﬁcatory impulse. The example of naming
here raises the possibility that other classiﬁcatory schemes,
where freedom and imagination are also strongly present,
contain particular culturally speciﬁc patterning.
To be sure, freedom and imagination, and their develop-
ment in a person, are critical to Pina-Cabral’s project here.
Yet these terms could be further developed. The patterning
he examines depends on the creativity of parents in ﬁnding
names and the exploration of the world by children. Naming
is just one element in the making of self-conscious individ-
uals in the Brazilian contexts here. Since we are talking about
ontogeny, the personal development of children in social life,
an analytical space for themes such as constraint and au-
thority could be carved out to complement the stress on
creative imagining of familial persons. Social processes do
not just accumulate in the person as a historical being; they
can be shifted around by powerful experiences such as
poverty and abuse. Or, how far can the image of learning as
scaffolded be taken? Might some supports be weaker than
others? If singularity matters, these differences are relevant:
not all singularities are equal. This is, however, to step be-
yond the experience-deep perspective so well elaborated here.
Although the main focus is on personhood as a historical
activity, I think there are signiﬁcant implications for a more
conventional historical approach. The radical embodied
cognition perspective avoids making a categorical distinction
between the making of individuals and the making of soci-
ety. Dorothy Holland and Jean Lave (2001) have written
recently about “history in person” and their vision of the
translation from conﬂict, violence, and struggles to the
production of the innermost part of our being. Their focus is
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on how humans come to learn about their identities in com-
plex, incoherent historical contexts. Bringing these authors
together provides insight into the past to address situations
where the documentary record is absent or fragmented. Given
what we know about the present, and armed with our situated
model of the person, how might past historicities be recon-
structed and reimagined as another present? Elsewhere, Pina-
Cabral has written about the notions of indeterminacy and
underdetermination to shift attention to the fuzzy translations
of anthropological analyses and to go beyond the notion of
culture. So too we can overcome a linear, evolutionary concept
of the past leading inevitably to the present. History in per-
son is made, in conditions not of one’s choosing, as multi-
threaded, looping backward and forward (as skills are learned
and unlearned) but not in successive phases, like balls lined
up in a tube. A next step is to examine the nature of the
continuity and discontinuity in the production of personhood
in particular contexts across generations.
Over the years, Pina-Cabral has made a series of powerful
and unique interventions in anthropological theory. I wel-
come this piece in the ongoing debate about the place of
human cognition in anthropological theory and an appro-
priate psychological approach to make the most of an eth-
nographic analysis. And for me, as a fellow Brazilianist, I am
most appreciative of the way poor Brazilians, and their cu-
rious naming practices, are made visible, and theoretically
pertinent, to those scholars who might pass too quickly over
them in favor of their exotic counterparts.
Susana Matos Viegas
Institute of Social Sciences, University of Lisbon, Av. Professor
Aníbal Bettencourt no. 9, 1150-129 Lisbon, Portugal (smviegas@ics
.ulisboa.pt). 5 II 16
Setting itself against a “semiotic theory of representation,”
Pina-Cabral’s article comes in sequence to a series of ana-
lytical proposals that mark a poststructuralist turn in the an-
thropology of personal names and personhood (Pina-Cabral
2010a:305). The author analyzes his ethnographic material
on “proper names” in coastal Bahia (Brazil) from the per-
spective of a historical sociality of personhood. My comment
will address two of the focal points in his paper: (A) proper
names are part of a dynamics of relatedness and (B) proper
names are part of ontogenetic processes that act in the
constitution of personhood in the life course.
A. Pina-Cabral proposes a new theoretical articulation
between proper names and family dynamics grounded on
radical embodied cognition. In his paper, he expands his
former proposal that onomastic seriality is “one of the forms
through which one ‘makes family’ in Bahia” (Pina-Cabral
2007:69). As the author had already sustained, onomastic
seriality (operating on ﬁliation, siblingship, and namesakes)
contributes to the constitution of relatedness by means of
constantly reiterated confrontations (cf. Pina-Cabral 2010b).
The usefulness of this proposal can be “tested,” ﬁrst of all,
in its most basic empiricism. This nonrepresentational per-
spective on onomastic seriality helps us to illuminate what
my own interlocutors in southern Bahia (where I have carried
out ﬁeldwork for more than a decade) constantly asserted
concerning name seriality, namely, that, despite being crea-
tively original and individualizing, proper names that are part
of a series are easier to remember. The reason for this is that
such names directly evoke either the parents’ names or those
of the siblings (cf. Viegas 2008:82–85). Pina-Cabral proposes
an articulation between names and relatedness that originates
in a view of personhood as an engagement in company—
which he deﬁnes as “complex communicational contexts
where viewpoints clash.” From this point of view, “serial in-
completeness” means that there is a break in the series, but
people see that break not as a failure of the serial naming
system but as part of it. Breaking the series, thus, is part of a
process of “making family,” a process of relatedness that
“never postulates family as closed group.” In this way, the
analysis of this instance of broken seriality allows Pina-Cabral
to exemplify his poststructuralist approach.
B. The author also proposes that the relation between
proper names and the construction of personhood is a trans-
formational process, that is to say, an ontogenetic process si-
multaneously at personal level and at that of cross gen-
erational “continued identities” (cf. Pina-Cabral 2010a:306;
2013a:76). Again in a nonrepresentationalist manner, he
argues that (personal or collective) identities are plural be-
cause they imply constantly renovating processes of “co-
presence.” This plurality can be particularly well observed in
the analysis of proper names, for name use involves “a con-
stant process of engagement with the panoply of objec-
tiﬁcations that shore up sociality over time” (Pina-Cabral
2010a:306). Therefore, the author takes the analysis of the
relation between personal names and life course way beyond
the traditional focus on the classiﬁcatory role of onomastic
systems. Typically, the most classical works on the subject in
modern anthropology were based on contexts where name
changes occurred throughout the life course (e.g., Fortes
1973; Watson 1986). But, in southern Bahia and, more
broadly, in most Christian contexts in general, one is not
supposed to change one’s proper name once it is attributed
(and it stays the same even after death). By focusing on the
role of proper names in the process of personal ontogeny,
nevertheless, Pina-Cabral shows how they play a central
constitutive role over the whole of the life course.
Thus, the present article widens the relevance of the an-
thropological approach on names, reinforcing its historical
and transformational aspects by deﬁnitely moving away
from an ontological vision of the individual or the group.
The proposal here is to overcome a culturalist view of human
meaning that sees semiotic processes as closed to the ma-
terial world. Rather, “basic mind” (intentionality) is seen to
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lay beside symbolic, scaffolded thinking (propositionality).
Basic mind operates for as long as a person remains alive by
means of processes of constitutive co-presence. These are
inevitable since “the world around us reﬂects back to us
constantly the relations that structured historically our con-
stitution as dividual persons” (Pina-Cabral 2013a:75). The
role of the concept of dividual person, therefore, is granted
theoretical centrality. This could be even further explored by
establishing boundaries with what would be a more post-
modern vision of fractal personhood.
Reply
The comments by Mark Harris and Susana de Matos Viegas
are very welcome. In light of his own work on Amazonian
Brazil (Harris 2000, 2010), Harris stresses the importance of
understanding naming, personhood, and generation from a
historical perspective, suggesting that my piece opens the
path to “examine the nature of the continuity and disconti-
nuity in the production of personhood . . . across gener-
ations.” This is a very insightful comment. As a matter of fact,
anthropologists do have to turn their attention again to the
concept of generation and the implications of age grouping.
The focus here, as Monica Wilson (1951) stressed half a
century ago, must be on company—that is, the diffuse and
overlaid modes of intersubjectivity that are the ground on
which all sociality rests. In personal ontogeny, sociality
emerges as a form of historicity; that is, persons emerge out
of other persons in a common world and thus are marked
by processes that similarly affect their coevals (cf. Fabian
1983:38ff.). In the course of our ontogeny, we encounter a
world where other humans have left their mark according to
connections of meaning that they assumed; our lived world
is not a chaotic jumble of perceptions. These syntonies go
way beyond explicit (propositional) meaning, for they are
inscribed (objectiﬁed) in the world that surrounds us and we
access them often through our basic minds, without recourse
to conscious meaning. Nevertheless, they contribute cen-
trally to validate our disposition to see the actions of others
as meaningful, that which Donald Davidson (2001) called
“interpretive charity” and is our door into language and
propositional thinking (cf. Hutto and Myin 2013).
This means that the type of relatedness that anthropol-
ogists normally call “kinship” cannot be studied indepen-
dently of the very processes of constitution of the persons
that are its principal nodes, as Marshall Sahlins (2011a,
2011b) and Maurice Bloch (2012:33) have recently reiter-
ated. We should never assume that collective identity, col-
lective memory, or collective thinking exist in and of them-
selves independently of the embodied persons that carry
them. In short, a focus on personhood can help us overcome
the deﬁnitional problems with kinship that arrested our
ancestors in the 1970s (cf. Needham 1971), as well as the
dissatisfaction with the primitivist take on “cultures” and
“societies” as numerable entities that arrested us in the 1990s
(cf. Ingold 1996; Kuper 1988, 2009).
Furthermore, as Harris remarks, this exercise is at the
center of the redeﬁnition of the very discipline of anthro-
pology that is going on right now. As people such as Bateson
(1972) have been claiming for a very long time (or more re-
cently Toren 2002), our discipline must ﬁnd a way of breaking
out of the nature/nurture, emic/etic oppositions that have
prevented it from dialoguing creatively with the rest of the
broadly deﬁned project of science throughout most of the
twentieth century. In many ways, it is the responsibility of
sociocultural anthropologists that biological anthropologists,
evolutionary psychologists, and primatologists should con-
tinue to ﬁnd it so difﬁcult to move beyond overly simplistic
models of determination.
In particular, anthropologists of all kinds should take in-
spiration from the neurological and philosophical reexami-
nations of cognition that are going on all around us (e.g.,
Anderson, Richardson, and Chemero 2012). There seems to
be a generalized agreement that this is the only way to move
beyond the forms of semiotic idealism that have besieged
anthropology epistemologically (cf. Toren and Pina-Cabral
2011). Sociocultural anthropology has been stuck for more
than a century in a neo-Kantian framework that overem-
phasises “difference” in sociocentric terms and, as a result,
sees human thinking as raised above materiality. The dia-
metrically opposite approach, however (i.e., the metaphori-
cal attribution to nonhuman entities of the modes of sym-
bolic action characteristic of human sociality, as per many of
Latour’s followers—e.g., Bennett 2010; Kohn 2013) is equally
bound to fail, for it is literally unfounded.
The centrality of the ethnographic gesture in anthropo-
logical thinking obliges us to account for human transcen-
dence—as Viveiro de Castro puts it, we must “take it seri-
ously” (cf. Candea 2011). This methodological injunction,
however, cannot lead us to adopt forms of ontological rela-
tivism that are ultimately self-defeating. In short, in order to
safeguard ethnographic empiricism, anthropology requires a
form of minimal realism (cf. Lynch 1998). That way, it will be
able to combine dynamically human transcendence with
human embodiment—no amount of talk of “bodies” will
sufﬁce if the basic premises of the representationist con-
ceptions of belief are not questioned. My own encounter with
radical embodied cognition (cf. Chemero 2009; Hutto 2008),
extended mind (cf. Clark and Chalmers 1998), and enactiv-
ism (cf. Thompson 2007), as exempliﬁed in this present essay,
aims precisely at achieving such a goal.
Following in the line of his own earlier work on historicity
(Harris 2007), Harris makes the point that humans, as
persons, are necessarily the products of history conceived as
the full inherence in time (past and future) of the human
condition. Therefore, as he points out, the matter of freedom
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of choice is indeed highly relevant. Naming practices are
“good to think with” in this aspect. The role of names differs
in distinct sociohistoric contexts and according to different
modes of naming. Names may contribute toward objectifying
personhood (as in modern bureaucratic systems, where the
person has one ﬁxed set of names), or may make it relational
(as in technonyms, or in naming systems where names are
private to speciﬁc interpersonal relations) or yet as a trans-
formational device (as in nicknames, or name change at life
cycle rituals). Whichever way, the process of naming is always
an encounter of imagination with conformity, of freedom
with constraint, of self-determination with determination by
and of others. Twentieth-century anthropology inherited
from the belle époque the disposition to see people as sub-
ordinated, constrained, or molded by the formatting effect of
“society”—seeing “cultures” as separate, itemizable entities.We
must move beyond these forms of sociocentrism, as they ob-
viate the matter of personal freedom and imagination as much
as the necessarily material nature of all sociality. The fact of
mind being extended is relevant not only in that persons have
a body but also in the more radical aspect that they are a body.
In turn, in her comments, Viegas corroborates how seri-
ality is an important aspect of personal constitution in
southern Bahia, arguing for an approach that sees personal
relatedness as dynamic. Based on her own ﬁeldwork (Viegas
2007), she stresses the aspect of memory. Her informants
explicitly explained name seriality as a form of mapping the
world of relations. This is a centrally important idea, since it
shows how names effect forms of objectivation that consti-
tute a scaffolding of the relational world.
Viegas stresses how my argument depends on notions of
extended mind (cf. Prinz and Clark 2004) and radical em-
bodied cognition in order to break with our already ex-
hausted neo-Kantian understandings of belief. As a matter of
fact, we have for too long chosen to disregard the implica-
tions for anthropological theory and ethnographic practice
of the poststructuralist critique of people such as Needham
(1983), Ardener (2006), or Feleppa (1988). Their readings of
Wittgenstein or Quine were simply considered by the post-
modern generation in the 1990s as too outlandish to be taken
seriously. This was a serious error. Consequently, sociocul-
tural anthropologists have failed to be inﬂuenced in episte-
mological matters by the “anomalous monism” of Donald
Davidson (2001) or, in ethical and ontological matters, by the
reading that Husserl and Lévinas made of Lévy-Bruhl (1957).
The price for that has been that, faced with the exhaustion of
sociocentric thinking (taken to its most sophisticated limit in
the work of Pierre Bourdieu), anthropologists have not been
able to move beyond the patently exhausted primitivist proj-
ect that they inherited from the belle époque.
It is my contention that, in this matter, the so-called on-
tological turn is yet another form of defeatist agnosticism
shored up by forms of nostalgic primitivism. Somehow an-
thropologists have managed to avert their attention from the
poor quality of Deleuze’s anthropology (his philosophy was
up to date, but his anthropology was retrograde). My own
argument—which I have developed at length in a series of
papers written for HAU concerning the notion of “world”
(cf. Pina-Cabral 2014a, 2014b)—is that if we are to propose
an anthropological project for the twenty-ﬁrst century, we
need to go beyond the exclusive fascination with meaning,
narrative, and discourse that closes sociality within the
bounds of propositionality (we have to expand the matter of
consciousness, as Damásio [2000] proposed already a long
time ago). For that, however, we have to radically revise our
approach to personhood and cognition in line with the new
approaches that are emerging all around us in our neigh-
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